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Abstract
Recently developed toy models for the mean-field games of corruption and bot-
net defence in cyber-security with three or four states of agents are extended to
a more general mean-field-game model with 2d states, d ∈ N. In order to tackle
new technical difficulties arising from a larger state-space we introduce new asymp-
totic regimes, namely small discount and small interaction asymptotics. Moreover,
the link between stationary and time-dependent solutions is established rigorously
leading to a performance of the turnpike theory in a mean-field-game setting.
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1 Introduction
Toy models for the mean-field games of corruption and botnet defense in cyber-security
were developed in [18] and [17]. These were games with three and four states of the
agents respectively. Here we develop a more general mean-field-game model with 2d
states, d ∈ N, that extend the models of [18] and [17]. In order to tackle new technical
difficulties arising from a larger state-space we introduce new asymptotic regimes, small
discount and small interaction asymptotics. Hence the properties that we obtain for the
new model do not cover more precise results of [18] and [17] (with the full classification of
the bifurcation points), but capture their main qualitative and quantitative features and
provide regular solutions away from the points of bifurcations. Apart from new modeling,
this paper contributes to one of the key questions in the modern study of mean-field games,
namely, what is the precise link between stationary and time -dependent solutions. This
problem is sorted out here for a concrete model, but the method can be definitely used
in more general situations.
∗Supported by RFFI grant No 14-06-00326
†Department of Statistics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL UK, Email:
v.kolokoltsov@warwick.ac.uk and associate member of Institute of Informatics Problems, FRC
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‡Fac. of Appl. Math. and Control Processes, St.-Petersburg State Univ., Russia
1
On the one hand, our model is a performance of the general pressure-and-resistance-
game framework of [16] and the nonlinear Markov battles of [15], and on the other hand, it
represents a simple example of mean-field- and evolutionary-game modeling of networks.
Initiating the development of the latter, we stress already here that two-dimensional arrays
of states arise naturally in many situations, one of the dimensions being controlled mostly
by the decision of agents (say, the level of tax evasion in the context of inspection games)
and the other one by a principal (major player) or evolutionary interactions (say, the level
of agents in bureaucratic staircase, the type of a computer virus used by botnet herder,
etc).
We shall dwell upon two basic interpretations of our model: corrupted bureaucrats
playing against the principal (say, governmental representative, also referred in literature
as benevolent dictator) or computer owners playing against a botnet herder (which then
takes the role of the principal), which tries to infect the computers with viruses. Other
interpretations can be done, for instance, in the framework of the inspection games (in-
spector and tax payers) or of the disease spreading in epidemiology (among animals or
humans), or the defense against a biological weapon. Here we shall keep the principal in
the background concentrating on the behavior of small players (corrupted bureaucrats or
computer owners), which we shall refer to as agents or players.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce our model specify-
ing in this context the basic notions of the mean-field-game (MFG) consistency problem in
its dynamic and stationary versions. In section 3 we calculate explicitly all non-degenerate
solutions of the stationary MFG problem. In section 4 we show how from a stationary
solution one can construct a class of full time-dependent solutions satisfying the so-called
turnpike property around the stationary one.
We complete this introductory section with short bibliographical notes.
Analysis of the spread of corruption in bureaucracy is a well recognized area of the
application of game theory, which attracted attention of many researchers. General sur-
veys can be found in [1], [14], [23]. More recent literature is reviewed in [18], see also [26],
[2] for electric and engineering interpretations of corruption games.
The use of game theory in modeling attacker-defender has been extensively adopted
in the computer security domain recently, see [7], [24] and [25] and bibliography there for
more details.
Mean-field games present a quickly developing area of the game theory. Their study
was initiated by Lasry-Lions [22] and Huang-Malhame-Caines [13] and has been quickly
developing since then, see [3], [6], [12], [11], [8] for recent surveys, as well as [9], [10], [4],
[21] [28], [5] and references therein for some further developments.
2 The model
We assume that any agent has 2d states: iI and iS, where i ∈ {1, · · · , d} and is referred
to as a strategy. In the first interpretation the letters S or I designate the senior or initial
position of a bureaucrat in the hierarchical staircase and i designates the level or type of
corruptive behavior (say, the level of bribes one asks from customers or, more generally,
the level of illegal profit he/she aims at). In the literature on corruption the state I is
often denoted by R and is referred to as the reserved state. It is interpreted as a job of
the lowest salary given to the not trust-worthy bureaucrats. In the second interpretation
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the letters S or I designate susceptible or infected states of computers and i denotes the
level or the type of defense system available on the market.
We assume that the choice of a strategy depends exclusively on the decision of an
agent. The control parameter u of each player may have d values denoting the strategy
the agent prefers at a moment. As long as this coincides with the current strategy, the
updating of a strategy does not occur. Once the decision to change i to j is made, the
actual updating is supposed to occur with a certain rate λ. Following [17], we shall be
mostly interested in the asymptotic regime of fast execution of individual decisions, that
is, λ→∞.
The change between S and I may have two causes: the action of the principal (pressure
game component) and of the peers (evolutionary component). In the first interpretation
the principal can promote the bureaucrats from the initial to the senior position or de-
grade them to the reserved initial position, whenever their illegal behavior is discovered.
The peers can also take part in this process contributing to the degrading of corrupted
bureaucrats, for instance, when they trespass certain social norms. In the second in-
terpretation the principal, the botnet herder, infects computers with the virus by direct
attacks turning S to I, and the virus then spreads through the network of computers by
a pairwise interaction. The recovery change from I to S is due to some system of repairs
which can be different in different protection levels i.
Let qi+ denote the recovery rates of upgrading from iR to iS and q
i
− the rates of
degrading (punishment or infection) from state iR to iS, which are independent of the
state of other agents (pressure component), and let βij denote the rates at which an agent
in state iI can stimulate the degrading (punishment or infection) of another agent from jS
to jI (evolutionary component). For simplicity we ignore here the possibility of upgrading
changes from jS to jI due to the interaction with peers.
A state of the system is a vector n = (n1S, n1I , · · · , ndS, ndI) with coordinates pre-
senting the number of agents in the corresponding states, or its normalized version
x = (x1S, x1I , · · · , xdS , xdI) = n/N with N = n1S + n1I + · · · + ndS + ndI the total
number of agents.
Therefore, assuming that all players have the same strategy ucomt = {u
com(iS), ucom(iI)},
the evolution of states in the limit of large number of players N → ∞ is given by the
equations
x˙iI = λ
∑
j 6=i
xjI1(u
com(jI) = i)− λ
∑
j 6=i
xiI1(u
com(iI) = j) + xiSq
i
− − xiIq
i
+ +
∑
j
xiSxjIβji,
x˙iS = λ
∑
j 6=i
xjS1(u
com(jS) = i)− λ
∑
j 6=i
xiS1(u
com(iS) = j)− xiSq
i
− + xiIq
i
+ −
∑
j
xiSxjIβji,
(1)
for all i = 1, · · · , d. Here and below 1(M) denotes the indicator function of a set M .
Remark 1. It is well known that evolutions of this type can be derived rigorously as the
dynamic law of large numbers for the corresponding Markov models of a finite number of
players, see detail e.g. in [15] or [16].
To specify the optimal behavior of agents we have to introduce payoffs in different
states and possibly costs for transitions. For simplicity we shall ignore here the latter.
Talking about corrupted agents it is natural to talk about maximizing profit, while talking
3
about infected computers it is natural to talk about minimizing costs. To unify the exposi-
tion we shall deal with the minimization of costs, which is equivalent to the maximization
of their negations.
Let wiI and w
i
S denote the costs per time-unit of staying in iI and iS respectively.
According to our interpretation of S as a better state, wiS < w
i
I for all i.
Given the evolution of the states x = x(s) of the whole system on a time interval [t, T ],
the individually optimal costs g(iI) and g(iS) and individually optimal control uinds (iI)
and uinds (iS) can be found from the HJB equation
g˙(iI) + λmin
u
d∑
j=1
1(u(iI) = j)(g(jI)− g(iI)) + qi+(g(iS)− g(iI)) + w
i
I = 0,
g˙(iS) + λmin
u
d∑
j=1
1(u(iS) = j)(g(jS)− g(iS)) + qi−(g(iI)− g(iS))
+
d∑
j=1
βjixjI(s)(g(iI)− g(iS)) + w
i
S = 0.
(2)
The basic MFG consistency equation for a time interval [t, T ] can now be written as
ucoms = u
ind
s .
Remark 2. The reasonability of this condition in the setting of the large number of
players is more or less obvious. And in fact in many situations it was proved rigorously
that its solutions represent the ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the corresponding Markov model of
N players, with ǫ→ 0 as N →∞, see e.g. [4] for finite state models considered here.
In this paper we shall mostly work with discounted payoff with the discounting coef-
ficient δ > 0, in which case the HJB equation for the discounted optimal payoff e−sδg of
an individual player with any time horizon T writes down as
g˙(iI) + λmin
u
d∑
j=1
1(u(iI) = j)(g(jI)− g(iI)) + qi+(g(iS)− g(iI)) + w
i
I = δg(iI),
g˙(iS) + λmin
u
d∑
j=1
1(u(iS) = j)(g(jS)− g(iS)) + qi−(g(iI)− g(iS))
+
d∑
j=1
βjixjI(s)(g(iI)− g(iS)) + w
i
S = δg(iS).
(3)
Notice that since this is an equation in a Euclidean space with Lipschitz coefficients,
it has a unique solution for s ≤ T and any given boundary condition g at time T and any
measurable functions xiI(s).
For the discounted payoff the basicMFG consistency equation ucoms = u
ind
s for a time in-
terval [t, T ] can be reformulated by saying that x, u, g solve the coupled forward-backward
system (1), (3), so that ucoms used in (1) coincide with the minimizers in (3). The main
objective of the paper is to provide a general class of solutions of the discounted MFG
consistency equation with stationary (time-independent) controls ucoms .
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As a first step to this objective we shall analyse the fully stationary solutions, when
the evolution (1) is replaced by the corresponding fixed point condition:
λ
∑
j 6=i
xjI1(u
com(jI) = i)− λ
∑
j 6=i
xiI1(u
com(iI) = j) + xiSq
i
− − xiIq
i
+ +
∑
j
xiSxjIβji = 0,
λ
∑
j 6=i
xjS1(u
com(jS) = i)− λ
∑
j 6=i
xiS1(u
com(iS) = j)− xiSq
i
− + xiIq
i
+ −
∑
j
xiSxjIβji = 0.
(4)
There are two standard stationary optimization problems naturally linked with a dy-
namic one, one being the search for the average payoff for long period game, and another
the search for discounted optimal payoff. The first is governed by the solutions of HJB of
the form (T − s)µ+ g, linear in s (then µ describing the optimal average payoff), so that
g satisfies the stationary HJB equation:
λmin
u
d∑
j=1
1(u(iI) = j)(g(jI)− g(iI) + cij) + q
i
+(g(iS)− g(iI)) + w
i
I = µ,
λmin
u
d∑
j=1
1(u(iS) = j)(g(jS)− g(iS) + cij) + q
i
−(g(iI)− g(iS))
+
d∑
j=1
βjixjI(g(iI)− g(iS)) + w
i
S = µ.
(5)
In the second problem, if the discounting coefficient is δ, the stationary discounted
optimal payoff g satisfies the stationary version of (3):
λmin
u
d∑
j=1
1(u(iI) = j)(g(jI)− g(iI) + cij) + q
i
+(g(iS)− g(iI)) + w
i
I = δg(iI),
λmin
u
d∑
j=1
1(u(iS) = j)(g(jS)− g(iS) + cij) + q
i
−(g(iI)− g(iS))
+
d∑
j=1
βjixjI(g(iI)− g(iS)) + w
i
S = δg(iS).
(6)
In [18] and [17] we concentrated on the first approach, and here we shall concentrate
on the second one, with a discounted payoff. The stationary MFG consistency condition
is the coupled system of equations (4) and (6), so that the individually optimal stationary
control uind found from (6) coincides with the common stationary control ucom from (4).
For simplicity we shall be interested in non-degenerate controls uind characterized by
the condition that the minimum in (6) is always attained on a single value of u.
A new technical novelty as compared with [17] and [18] will be systematic working
in the asymptotic regimes of small discount δ and small interaction coefficients βij . This
approach leads to more or less explicit calculations of stationary MFG solutions and their
further justification.
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3 Stationary MFG problem
The following result identifies all possible stationary non-degenerate controls that can
occur as solutions of (6).
Proposition 3.1. Non-degenerate controls solving (6) could be only of the type [i(I), k(S)]:
switch to strategy i when in I and to k when in S.
Proof. If moving from the strategy k to the strategy i is optimal, then g(i) < g(l) for all
l and hence moving from m to i is optimal for any m.
Let us consider first the control [i(I), i(S)] denoting it by uˆi:
uˆi(jS) = uˆi(jI) = i, j = 1, · · · , d.
We shall refer to the control uˆi as the one with the strategy i individually optimal.
The control uˆi and the corresponding distribution x solve the stationary MFG problem
if they solve the corresponding HJB (6), that is

qi+(g(iS)− g(iI)) + w
i
I = δg(iI),
qi−(g(iI)− g(iS)) +
∑
k
βkixkI(g(iI)− g(iS)) + w
i
S = δg(iS),
λ(g(iI)− g(jI)) + qj+(g(jS)− g(jI)) + w
j
I = δg(jI), j 6= i,
λ(g(iS)− g(jS)) + qj−(g(jI)− g(jS))
+
∑
k
βkjxkI(g(jI)− g(jS)) + w
j
S = δg(jS), j 6= i,
(7)
where for all j 6= i
g(iI) ≤ g(jI), g(iS) ≤ g(jS), (8)
and x is a fixed point of the evolution (4) with ucom = uˆi, that is

xiSq
i
− − xiIq
i
+ +
∑
j
xiSxjIβji + λ
∑
j 6=i
xjI = 0,
− xiSq
i
− + xiIq
i
+ −
∑
j
xiSxjIβji + λ
∑
j 6=i
xjS = 0,
xjSq
j
− − xjIq
j
+ +
∑
k
xjSxkIβkj − λxjI = 0, j 6= i,
− xjSq
j
− + xjIq
j
+ −
∑
k
xjSxkIβji − λxjS = 0, j 6= i.
(9)
This solution (uˆi, x) is stable if x is a stable fixed point of the evolution (1) with
ucom = uˆi, that is, of the evolution
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

x˙iI = xiSq
i
− − xiIq
i
+ +
∑
j
xiSxjIβji + λ
∑
j 6=i
xjI ,
x˙iS = −xiSq
i
− + xiIq
i
+ −
∑
j
xiSxjIβji + λ
∑
j 6=i
xjS,
x˙jI = xjSq
j
− − xjIq
j
+ +
∑
k
xjSxkIβkj − λxjI , j 6= i,
x˙jS = −xjSq
j
− + xjIq
j
+ −
∑
k
xjSxkIβji − λxjS, j 6= i.
(10)
Adding together the last two equations of (9) we find that xjI = xjS = 0 for j 6= i, as
one could expect. Consequently, the whole system (9) reduces to the single equation
xiSq
i
− + xiIβiixiS − xiIq
i
+ = 0,
which, for y = xiI , 1− y = xiS , yields the quadratic equation
Q(y) = βiiy
2 + y(qi+ − βii + q
i
−)− q
i
− = 0,
with the unique solution on the interval (0, 1):
x∗ =
1
2βii
[
βii − q
i
+ − q
i
− +
√
(βii + qi−)
2 + (qi+)
2 − 2qi+(βii − q
i
−)
]
. (11)
To analyze stability of the fixed point xiI = x
∗, xiS = 1 − x
∗ and xjI = xjS = 0 for
j 6= i, we introduce the variables y = xiI − x
∗. In terms of y and xjI , xjS with j 6= i,
system (10) rewrites as

y˙ = [1− x∗ − y −
∑
j 6=i
(xjI + xjS)][q− +
∑
k 6=i
xkIβki + (y + x
∗)βii]− (y + x
∗)qi+ + λ
∑
j 6=i
xjI ,
x˙jI = xjS[q
j
− +
∑
k 6=i
xkIβkj + (y + x
∗)βij ]− xjIq
j
+ − λxjI , j 6= i,
x˙jS = −xjS[q
j
− +
∑
k 6=i
xkIβkj + (y + x
∗)βij] + xjIq
j
+ − λxjS, j 6= i.
(12)
Its linearized version around the fixed point zero is

y˙ = (1− x∗)(
∑
k 6=i
xkIβki + yβii)− [y +
∑
k 6=i
(xkI + xkS)](q
i
− + x
∗βii)− yq
i
+ +
∑
k 6=i
λxkI ,
x˙jI = xjS(q
j
− + x
∗βij)− xjIq
j
+ − λxjI , j 6= i,
x˙jS = −xjS(q
j
− + x
∗βij) + xjIq
j
+ − λxjS, j 6= i.
Since the equations for xjI , xjS contain neither y nor other variables, the eigenvalues
of this linear system are
ξi = (1− 2x
∗)βii − q
i
− − q
i
+,
and (d− 1) pairs of eigenvalues arising from (d− 1) systems{
x˙jI = xjS(q
j
− + x
∗βij)− xjIq
j
+ − λxjI , j 6= i,
x˙jS = −xjS(q
j
− + x
∗βij) + xjIq
j
+ − λxjS, j 6= i,
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that is {
ξj1 = −λ− (q
j
+ + q
j
− + x
∗βii)
ξj2 = −λ.
These eigenvalues being always negative, the condition of stability is reduced to the
negativity of the first eigenvalue ξi:
2x∗ > 1−
qi+ + q
i
−
βii
.
But this is true due to (11) implying that this fixed point is always stable (by the Grobman-
Hartman theorem).
Next, the HJB equation (7) takes the form


qi+(g(iS)− g(iI)) + w
i
I = δg(iI),
qi−(g(iI)− g(iS)) + βiix
∗(g(iI)− g(iS)) + wiS = δg(iS),
λ(g(iI)− g(jI)) + qj+(g(jS)− g(jI)) + w
j
I = δg(jI), j 6= i,
λ(g(iS)− g(jS)) + qj−(g(jI)− g(jS))
+ βijx
∗(g(jI)− g(jS)) + wjS = δg(jS), j 6= i,
(13)
Subtracting the first equation from the second one yields
g(iI)− g(iS) =
wiI − w
i
S
qi− + q
i
+ + βiix
∗ + δ
. (14)
In particular, g(iI) > g(iS) always, as expected. Next, by the first equation of (13),
δg(iI) = wiI −
qi+(w
i
I − w
i
S)
qi− + q
i
+ + βiix
∗ + δ
. (15)
Consequently,
δg(iS) = wiI −
(qi+ + δ)(w
i
I − w
i
S)
qi− + q
i
+ + βiix
∗ + δ
= wiS +
(qi− + βiix
∗)(wiI − w
i
S)
qi− + q
i
+ + βiix
∗ + δ
. (16)
Subtracting the third equation of (13) from the fourth one yields
(λ+ qj+ + q
j
− + βiix
∗ + δ)(g(jI)− g(jS))− λ(g(iI)− g(iS)) = wiI − w
i
S,
implying
g(jI)− g(jS) =
wjI − w
j
S + λ(g(iI)− g(iS))
λ+ qj+ + q
j
− + βijx
∗ + δ
= g(iI)− g(iS) + [(wjI −w
j
S)− (g(iI)− g(iS))(q
j
+ + q
j
− + βijx
∗ + δ)]λ−1 +O(λ−2). (17)
From the fourth equation of (13) it now follows that
(δ + λ)g(jI) = wjI − q
j
+(g(jI)− g(jS)) + λg(iI),
8
so that
g(jI) = g(iI) + [wjI − q
j
+(g(iI)− g(iS))− δg(iI)]λ
−1 +O(λ−2). (18)
Consequently,
g(jS) = g(jI)− (g(jI)− g(jS))
= g(iS) + [wjS + (q
j
− + βiix
∗)(g(iI)− g(iS))− δg(iS)]λ−1 +O(λ−2). (19)
Thus the consistency conditions (8) in the main order in λ→∞ become
wjI − q
j
+(g(iI)− g(iS))− δg(iI) ≥ 0, w
j
S + (q
j
− + βiix
∗)(g(iI)− g(iS))− δg(iS) ≥ 0,
or equivalently
wjI − w
i
I ≥
(qj+ − q
i
+)(w
i
I − w
i
S)
qi− + q
i
+ + βiix
∗ + δ
, wjS − w
i
S ≥
[qi− − q
j
− + (βii − βij)x
∗](wiI − w
i
S)
qi− + q
i
+ + βiix
∗ + δ
. (20)
In the first order in small βii this gets the simpler form, independent of x
∗:
wjI − w
i
I
wiI − w
i
S
≥
qj+ − q
i
+
qi− + q
i
+ + δ
,
wjS − w
i
S
wiI − w
i
S
≥
qi− − q
j
−
qi− + q
i
+ + δ
. (21)
Summarizing, we proved the following.
Proposition 3.2. If (21) holds for all j 6= i with the strict inequality, then for sufficiently
large λ and sufficiently small βij there exists a unique solution to the stationary MFG
consistency problem (4) and (6) with the optimal control uˆi, the stationary distribution is
xIi = x
∗, xSi = 1− x
∗ with x∗ given by (11) and it is stable; the optimal payoffs are given
by (15), (16), (18), (19). Conversely, if for all sufficiently large λ there exists a solution
to the stationary MFG consistency problem (4) and (6) with the optimal control uˆi, then
(20) holds.
Let us turn to control [i(I), k(S)] with k 6= i denoting it by uˆi,k:
uˆi,k(jS) = k, uˆi,k(jI) = i, j = 1, · · · , d.
The fixed point condition under ucom = uˆi,k takes the form

xiSq
i
− − xiIq
i
+ +
∑
j
xiSxjIβji + λ
∑
j 6=i
xjI = 0
− xiSq
i
− + xiIq
i
+ −
∑
j
xiSxjIβji − λxiS = 0
xkSq
k
− − xkIq
k
+ +
∑
j
xkSxjIβjk − λxkI = 0
− xkSq
i
− + xkIq
k
+ −
∑
j
xkSxjIβjk + λ
∑
j 6=k
xjS = 0
xlSq
l
− − xlIq
l
+ +
∑
j
xlSxjIβjl − λxlS = 0
− xlSq
l
− + xlIq
l
+ −
∑
j
xlSxjIβjl − λxlI = 0,
(22)
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where l 6= i, k.
Adding the last two equations yields xlI + xlS = 0 and hence xlI = xlS = 0 for all
l 6= i, k, as one could expect. Consequently, for indices i, k the system gets the form

xiSq
i
− − xiIq
i
+ + xiSxiIβii + xiSxkIβki + λxkI = 0
− xiSq
i
− + xiIq
i
+ − xiSxiIβii − xiSxkIβki − λxiS = 0
xkSq
k
− − xkIq
k
+ + xkSxkIβkk + xkSxiIβik − λxkI = 0
− xkSq
i
− + xkIq
k
+ − xkSxkIβkk − xkSxiIβik + λxiS = 0
(23)
Adding the first two equation (or the last two equations) yields xkI = xiS. Since by
normalization
xkS = 1− xiS − xkI − xiI = 1− xiI − 2xkI ,
we are left with two equations only:{
xkIq
i
− − xiIq
i
+ + xkIxiIβii + x
2
kIβki + λxkI = 0
(1− xiI − 2xkI)(q
k
− + xkIβkk + xiIβik)− (λ+ q
k
+)xkI = 0.
(24)
From the first equation we obtain
xiI =
λxkI + βkix
2
kI + q
i
−xkI
qi+ − xkIβii
=
λxkI
qi+ − xkIβii
(1 +O(λ−1)).
Hence xkI is of order 1/λ, and therefore
xiI =
λxkI
qi+
(1 +O(λ−1))⇐⇒ xkI =
xiIq
i
+
λ
(1 +O(λ−1)). (25)
In the major order in large λ asymptotics, the second equation of (24) yields
(1− xiI)(q
k
− + βikxiI)− q
i
+xiI = 0
or for y = xiI
Q(y) = βiky
2 + y(qi+ − βik + q
k
−)− q
k
− = 0,
which is effectively the same equation as the one that appeared in the analysis of the
control [i(I), i(S)]. It has the unique solution on the interval (0, 1):
x∗iI =
1
2βik
[
βik − q
i
+ − q
k
− +
√
(βik + q
k
−)
2 + (qi+)
2 − 2qi+(βik − q
k
−)
]
. (26)
Let us note that for small βik it expands as
x∗iI =
qk−
qk− + q
i
+
+O(β) =
qk−
qk− + q
i
+
+
qk−q
i
+
(qk− + q
i
+)
3
β +O(β2). (27)
Similar (a bit more lengthy) calculations, as for the control [i(I), i(S)] show that the
obtained fixed point of evolution (1) is always stable. We omit the detail, as they are the
same as given in [17] for the case d = 2.
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Let us turn to the HJB equation (7), which under control [i(I), k(S)] takes the form

qi+(g(iS)− g(iI)) + w
i
I = δg(iI),
λ(g(kS)− g(iS)) + q˜i−(g(iI)− g(iS)) + w
i
S = δg(iS),
λ(g(iI)− g(kI)) + qk+(g(kS)− g(kI)) + w
k
I = δg(kI),
q˜k−(g(kI)− g(kS)) + w
k
S = δg(kS)
λ(g(iI)− g(jI)) + qj+(g(jS)− g(jI)) + w
j
I = δg(jI), j 6= i, k,
λ(g(kS)− g(jS)) + q˜j−(g(jI)− g(jS)) + w
j
S = δg(jS), j 6= i, k,
(28)
supplemented by the consistency condition
g(iI) ≤ g(jI), g(kS) ≤ g(jS), (29)
for all j, where we introduced the notation
q˜j− = q˜
j
−(i, k) = q
j
− + βijxiI + βkjxkI . (30)
The first four equations do not depend on the rest of the system and can be solved
independently. To begin with, we use the first and the fourth equation to find
g(iS) = g(iI) +
δg(iI)− wiI
qi+
, g(kI) = g(kS) +
δg(kS)− wkS
q˜k−
. (31)
Then the second and the third equations can be written as the system for the variables
g(kS) and g(iI):

λg(kS)− (λ+ δ)g(iI)− (λ+ δ + q˜i−)
δg(iI)− wiI
qi+
+ wiS = 0
λg(iI)− (λ+ δ)g(kS)− (λ+ δ + qk+)
δg(kS)− wkS
q˜k−
+ wkI = 0,
or simpler as{
λqi+g(kS)− [λ(q
i
+ + δ) + δ(q
i
+ + q˜
i
− + δ)]g(iI) = −w
i
I(λ+ δ + q˜
i
−)− w
i
Sq
i
+
[λ(q˜k− + δ) + δ(q˜
k
− + q
k
+ + δ)]g(kS)− λq˜
k
−g(iI) = w
k
I q˜
k
− + w
k
S(λ+ δ + q
k
+).
(32)
Let us find the asymptotic behavior of the solution for large λ. To this end let us write
g(iS) = g0(iS) +
g1(iS)
λ
+O(λ−2)
with similar notations for other values of g. Dividing (32) by λ and preserving only the
leading terms in λ we get the system{
qi+g
0(kS)− (qi+ + δ)g
0(iI) = −wiI ,
(q˜k− + δ)g
0(kS)− q˜k−g
0(iI) = wkS.
(33)
Solving this system and using (31) to find the corresponding leading terms g0(iS), g0(kI)
yields
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g0(iS) = g0(kS) =
1
δ
q˜k−w
i
I + q
i
+w
k
S + δw
k
S
q˜k− + q
i
+ + δ
,
g0(kI) = g0(iI) =
1
δ
q˜k−w
i
I + q
i
+w
k
S + δw
i
I
q˜k− + q
i
+ + δ
.
(34)
The remarkable equations g0(iS) = g0(kS) and g0(kI) = g0(iI) arising from the
calculations have natural interpretation: for instantaneous execution of personal decisions
the discrimination between strategies i and j is not possible. Thus to get the conditions
ensuring (29) we have to look for the next order of expansion in λ.
Keeping in (32) the terms of zero-order in 1/λ yields the system{
qi+g
1(kS)− (qi+ + δ)g
1(iI) = δ(qi+ + q˜
i
− + δ)g
0(iI)− wiI(δ + q˜
i
−)− w
i
Sq
i
+
(q˜k− + δ)g
1(kS)− q˜k−g
1(iI) = −δ(q˜k− + q
k
+ + δ)g
0(kS) + wkI q˜
k
− + w
k
S(δ + q
k
+).
(35)
Taking into account (34), conditions g(iI) ≤ g(kI) and g(kS) ≤ g(iS) turn to
q˜k−g
1(iI) ≤ g1(kS)(q˜k− + δ), q
i
+g
1(kS) ≤ g1(iI)(qi+ + δ). (36)
Solving (35) we obtain
g1(kS)δ(q˜k− + q
i
+ + δ) = q˜
k
−[q
i
+w
i
S + (q
i
+ + δ)w
k
I + (q˜
i
− − q˜
k
− − q
i
+ − δ)w
i
I ]
+ [qi+(q
k
+ − q˜
k
− − q
i
+) + δ(q
k
+ − q
i
+)]w
k
S,
g1(iI)δ(q˜k− + q
i
+ + δ) = q
i
+[q˜
k
−w
k
I + (q˜
k
− + δ)w
i
S + (q
k
+ − q
i
+ − q˜
k
− − δ)w
k
S]
+ [q˜k−(q˜
i
− − q
i
+ − q˜
k
−) + δ(q˜
i
− − q˜
k
−)]w
i
I ,
(37)
We can now check the conditions (36). Remarkably enough the r.h.s and l.h.s. of both
inequalities always coincide for δ = 0, so that the actual condition arises from comparing
higher terms in δ. In the first order with respect to the expansion in small δ conditions
(36) turn out to take the following simple form
q˜k−(w
k
I − w
i
I) + w
k
S(q
k
+ − q
i
+) ≥ 0, q
i
+(w
i
S − w
k
S) + w
i
I(q˜
i
− − q˜
k
−) ≥ 0. (38)
From the last two equations of (28) we can find g(jS) and g(jI) for j 6= i, k yielding
g(jI) = g(iI) +
1
λ
[wjI − δg(iI) + q
j
+(g(iI)− g(kS))] +O(λ
−2),
g(jS) = g(kS) +
1
λ
[wjS − δg(kS) + q˜
j
−(g(iI)− g(kS))] +O(λ
−2).
(39)
From these equations we can derive the rest of the conditions (29), namely that g(iI) ≤
g(jI) for j 6= k and g(kS) ≤ g(jS) for j 6= i. In the first order in the small δ expansion
they become
qj+(w
i
I − w
k
S) + w
j
I(q˜
k
− + q
i
+) ≥ 0, q˜
j
−(w
i
I − w
k
S) + w
j
S(q˜
k
− + q
i
+) ≥ 0. (40)
Since for small βij , the difference q˜
j
− − q
j
− is small, we proved the following result.
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Proposition 3.3. Assume
qj+(w
i
I − w
k
S) + w
j
I(q
k
− + q
i
+) > 0, j 6= k,
qj−(w
i
I − w
k
S) + w
j
S(q
k
− + q
i
+) > 0, j 6= i,
qk−(w
k
I − w
i
I) + w
k
S(q
k
+ − q
i
+) > 0, q
i
+(w
i
S − w
k
S) + w
i
I(q
i
− − q
k
−) > 0.
(41)
Then for sufficiently large λ, small δ and small βij there exists a unique solution to
the stationary MFG consistency problem (4) and (6) with the optimal control uˆi,k, the
stationary distribution is concentrated on strategies i and k with x∗iI being given by (26)
or (27) up to terms of order O(λ−1), and it is stable; the optimal payoffs are given by
(34), (37), (39).
Conversely, if for all sufficiently large λ and small δ there exists a solution to the
stationary MFG consistency problem (4) and (6) with the optimal control uˆi,k, then (38)
and (40) hold.
4 Main result
By the general result already mentioned above, see [4], a solution of MFG consistency
problem constructed above and considered on a finite time horizon will define an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium for the corresponding game of finite number of players. However, solutions
given by Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 work only when the initial distribution and terminal
payoff are exactly those given by the stationary solution. Of course, it is natural to ask
what happens for other initial conditions. Stability results of Propositions 3.2 and 3.3
represent only a step in the right direction here, as they ensure stability only under the
assumption that all (or almost all) players use from the very beginning the corresponding
stationary control, which might not be the case. To analyse the stability properly, we
have to consider the full time-dependent problem. For possibly time varying evolution
x(t) of the distribution, the time-dependent HJB equation for the discounted optimal
payoff e−tδg of an individual player with any time horizon T has form (3).
In order to have a solution with a stationary u we have to show that solving the linear
equation obtained from (3) by fixing this control will be consistent in the sense that this
control will actually give minimum in (3) in all times.
For definiteness, let us concentrate on the stationary control uˆi, the corresponding
linear equation getting the form

g˙(iI) + qi+(g(iS)− g(iI)) + w
i
I = δg(iI),
g˙(iS) + qi−(g(iI)− g(iS)) +
∑
k
βkixkI(t)(g(iI)− g(iS)) + w
i
S = δg(iS),
g˙(jI) + λ(g(iI)− g(jI)) + qj+(g(jS)− g(jI)) + w
j
I = δg(jI), j 6= i,
g˙(jS) + λ(g(iS)− g(jS)) + qj−(g(jI)− g(jS))
+
∑
k
βkjxkI(t)(g(jI)− g(jS)) + w
j
S = δg(jS), j 6= i,
(42)
with the consistency requirement (8), but which has to hold now for time-dependent
solution g.
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Theorem 4.1. Assume the strengthened form of (21) holds, that is
wjI − w
i
I
wiI − w
i
S
>
qj+ − q
i
+
qi− + q
i
+ + δ
,
wjS − w
i
S
wiI − w
i
S
>
qi− − q
j
−
qi− + q
i
+ + δ
(43)
for all j 6= i. Assume moreover that
qj+ > q
i
+, q
i
− > q
j
− (44)
for all j 6= i. Then for any λ > 0 and all sufficiently small βij the following holds. For any
T > t, any initial distribution x(t) and any terminal values gT such that gT (jI)−gT (jS) ≥
0 for all j, gT (iI)− gT (iS) is sufficiently small and
gT (iI) ≤ gT (jI) and gT (iS) ≤ gT (jS), j 6= i, (45)
there exists a unique solution to the discounted MFG consistency equation such that u is
stationary and equals uˆi everywhere. Moreover, this solution is such that, for large T − t,
x(s) tends to the fixed point of Proposition 3.2 for s→ T and gs stays near the stationary
solution of Proposition 3.2 almost all time apart from a small initial period around t and
some final period around T .
Remark 3. (i) The last property of our solution can be expressed by saying that the
stationary solution provides the so-called turnpike for the time-dependent solution, see
e.g. [19] and [29] for for reviews in stochastic and deterministic settings. (ii) Condition
(44) is strong and can possibly be dispensed with by a more detailed analysis. (iii) Similar
time-dependent class of turnpike solutions can be constructed from the stationary control
of Proposition 3.3.
Proof. To show that starting with the terminal condition belonging to the cone specified
by (45) we shall stay in this cone for all t ≤ T , it is sufficient to prove that on a boundary
point of this cone that can be achieved by the evolution the inverted tangent vector of
system (42) is not directed outside of the cone. This (more or less obvious) observation
is a performance of the general result of Bony, see e. g. [27]. From (42) we find that
g˙(jI)− g˙(iI) = (λ+ δ)(g(jI)−g(iI))+ qj+(g(jI)−g(jS))− q
i
+(g(iI)−g(iS))− (w
j
I −w
i
I).
Therefore, the condition for staying inside the cone (45) for a boundary point with g(jI) =
g(iI) reads out as
(wjI − w
i
I) ≥ q
j
+(g(jI)− g(jS))− q
i
+(g(iI)− g(iS)). (46)
Since
0 ≤ g(jI)− g(jS) ≤ g(iI)− g(iS),
a simpler sufficient condition for (46) is
(wjI − w
i
I) ≥ (q
j
+ − q
i
+)(g(iI)− g(iS)). (47)
Subtracting the first two equations of (42) we find that
g˙(iI)− g˙(iS) = a(s)(g(iI)− g(iS))− (wiI − w
i
S)
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with
a(t) = qi+ + q
i
− + δ +
∑
k
βkixkI(t).
Consequently,
gt(iI)−gt(iS) = exp{−
∫ T
t
a(s) ds}(gT (iI)−gT (iS))+(w
i
I−w
i
S)
∫ T
t
exp{−
∫ s
t
a(τ) dτ}ds.
(48)
Therefore, as we assumed (44), condition (47) will be fulfilled for all sufficiently small
gT (iI)− gT (iS) whenever
(wjI − w
i
I) > (q
j
+ − q
i
+)(w
i
I − w
i
S)
∫ T
t
exp{−
∫ s
t
a(τ) dτ}ds. (49)
But since a(t) ≥ qi+ + q
i
− + δ, we have
exp{−
∫ s
t
a(τ) dτ} ≤ exp{−(s− t)(qi+ + q
i
− + δ)},
so that (47) holds if
wjI − w
i
I
wiI − w
i
S
≥
qj+ − q
i
+
qi+ + q
i
− + δ
(
1− exp{−(T − t)(qi+ + q
i
− + δ)}
)
, (50)
which is true under the first assumptions of (43) and (44).
Similarly, to study a boundary point with g(jS) = g(iS) we find that
g˙(jS)− g˙(iS) = (λ+ δ)(g(jS)− g(iS))− (qj− +
∑
k
βkjxkI)(g(jI)− g(jS))
+(qi− +
∑
k
βkixkI)(g(iI)− g(iS))− (w
j
S − w
i
S).
Therefore, the condition for staying inside the cone (45) for a boundary point with g(jS) =
g(iS) reads out as
(wjS − w
i
S) ≥ (q
i
− +
∑
k
βkixkI)(g(iI)− g(iS))− (q
j
− +
∑
k
βkjxkI)(g(jI)− g(jS)). (51)
Now 0 ≤ g(iI)− g(iS) ≤ g(jI)− g(jS), so that (51) is fulfilled if
(wjS − w
i
S) ≥ (q
i
− +
∑
k
βkixkI − q
j
− −
∑
k
βkjxkI)(g(iI)− g(iS)) (52)
for all times. Taking into account the requirement that all βij are sufficiently small, we
find as above that it holds under the second assumptions of (43) and (44).
The last statement of the theorem concerning x(s) follows from the observation that
the eigenvalues of the linearized evolution x(s) are negative and well separated from zero
implying the global stability of the fixed point of the evolution for sufficiently small β.
The last statement of the theorem concerning g(s) follows by similar stability argument
for the linear evolution (42) taking into account that away from the initial point t, the
trajectory x(t) stays arbitrary close to its fixed point.
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